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DODGING DUE PROCESS: HOW UNITED 
STATES V. DODGE PUSHES THE LIMITS  
OF CIVIL REGULATION 
Abstract: On March 5, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit in United States v. Dodge held that courts may take a non-categorical 
approach in determining whether a defendant qualifies as a sex offender 
under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. Although a 
non-categorical approach is warranted by accepted standards of statutory 
construction, courts following a non-categorical approach in the future 
should be wary of violating due process. Given that registration require-
ments have certain punitive characteristics, defendants may be successful 
in due process challenges to registration decisions based on facts neither 
admitted by the defendant nor submitted to a jury. Moreover, registration 
decisions based on a defendant’s underlying conduct stray from prior Su-
preme Court reasoning suggesting that registration decisions based on 
conviction history alone are consistent with due process. 
Introduction 
 The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)1 is 
found under Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act 
of 2006.2 President George W. Bush signed the Adam Walsh Act into 
law with the promise that it would “strengthen Federal laws to protect 
our children from sexual and other violent crimes, . . . help prevent 
child pornography, and . . . make the Internet safer for our sons and 
daughters.”3 SORNA itself contains the stated purpose of protecting 
the “public from sex offenders and offenders against children.”4 Al-
though protecting the country’s children is of the utmost importance, 
after the 2010 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit in United States v. Dodge, courts may have to be careful that zeal 
                                                                                                                      
1 Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2250, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 16901–16962 (2006). 
2 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, Title I, 
§§ 101–635, 120 Stat. 590, 590–644 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A §§ 16901–16991, 3765, 3797ee 
to ee-1 (2006 & Supp. II 2009) and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
3 Remarks on Signing the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 
Wkly. Compilation Presidential Documents 1395, 1396 ( July 27, 2006). 
4 42 U.S.C. § 16901. 
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for punishment does not overshadow the basic rights of defendants 
subject to SORNA’s registration requirement.5 
 In Dodge, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that in deter-
mining whether a defendant committed a registerable sex offense un-
der SORNA, a court can look beyond the elements of the defendant’s 
statute of conviction to his underlying conduct.6 Thus, defendants con-
victed of crimes with elements that do not match SORNA’s definition of 
a sex offense may still have to register as sex offenders if courts deter-
mine that their underlying conduct constituted a registerable sex of-
fense.7 
 Part I of this Comment provides a brief description of SORNA and 
what it requires of registered sex offenders.8 Part II examines the facts 
of Dodge and the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in upholding the district 
court’s non-categorical approach to sex offender registration.9 Finally, 
Part III suggests that the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Dodge may raise 
due process concerns under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.10 
I. SORNA 
 SORNA is the most recent installment in a series of federal sex of-
fender registration laws.11 The first was the Wetterling Act, enacted in 
1994, which required states to create sex offender registries.12 Since 
then, Congress has passed a series of laws adding registration and pub-
lic notification requirements.13 Before SORNA was passed in 2006, 
                                                                                                                      
 
5 See United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2010); infra notes 68–120 
and accompanying text. 
6 597 F.3d at 1347. 
7 See id. at 1353–56. 
8 See infra notes 11–23 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 24–61 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 62–120 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. 
12 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. 
XVII, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006)); see National 
Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,030, 38,030 
( July 2, 2008). 
13 See Council of State Gov’ts, Sex Offender Management Policy in the States, 
Strengthening Policy & Practice: Final Report 1, 3, 7 (2010) [hereinafter Final 
Report], available at http://www.csg.org/policy/documents/SOMFinalReport-FINAL.pdf 
(providing a timeline of sex offender laws); see also Terra R. Lord, Comment, Closing Loop-
holes or Creating More? Why a Narrow Application of SORNA Threatens to Defeat the Statute’s Pur-
pose, 62 Okla. L. Rev. 273, 280 (2010). In 1996, for example, Congress adopted Megan’s 
Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e) (2006)), 
which amends the Wetterling Act to provide for community notification about nearby sex 
offenders, and the Pam Lyncher Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act, Pub. L. 
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states had substantial discretion in implementing their registration sys-
tems, leading to discrepancies between those systems and allowing of-
fenders to avoid registration by simply moving from one state to an-
other.14 With SORNA, Congress sought to close those loopholes by 
setting out a uniform system of registration with stricter baseline re-
quirements for states.15 
 After SORNA, sex offenders must register in each jurisdiction 
where they reside, are employed, and go to school.16 They must register 
their social security number, addresses, and other personal informa-
tion,17 update any changes in registration information within three 
business days,18 and remain registered from fifteen years to life.19 They 
also must verify their registration information in person every three 
months to one year.20 In addition, offenders’ information is published 
on the internet in a publicly accessible database21 and is provided to 
certain authorities, or anyone else who requests it, upon initial registra-
tion and whenever registration information is updated.22 SORNA also 
created a federal crime for failure to register, punishable by up to ten 
years in prison.23 
II. United States v. Dodge and the Non-Categorical Approach 
 Despite SORNA’s attempts to create a clear and comprehensive 
registration system, questions have arisen about who exactly is required 
to register.24 In Dodge, the Eleventh Circuit grappled with the question 
                                                                                                                      
No. 104-236, 110 Stat. 3093 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 14702, 14703 (2006)), which 
allows the FBI to create a national database of sex offender names and addresses. See Final 
Report, supra, at 7. 
14 See Lord, supra note 13, at 280. 
15 See Final Report, supra note 13, at 3–4 (providing a comprehensive overview of 
SORNA’s provisions); Lord, supra note 13, at 281. SORNA sought to close these loopholes 
through two types of requirements: (1) registration obligations on offenders wherever they 
reside, and (2) obligations on states to incorporate uniform SORNA standards. Applicabil-
ity of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 28 C.F.R. § 72.1 (2007). Registrants 
convicted of state and federal crimes are subject to the same general requirements. See id. 
16 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) (2006). 
17 Id. § 16914(a). 
18 Id. § 16913(c). 
19 Id. § 16915(a). 
20 Id. § 16916. 
21 Id. § 16918. 
22 42 U.S.C. § 16921 (2006). 
23 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006). For a detailed discussion of SORNA’s provisions, see National 
Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, supra note 12, at 38,044–70. 
24 See United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Byun, 539 F.3d 982, 983 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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of what qualifies as a registerable “sex offense” under SORNA.25 The 
appellant, Matthew Dodge, was originally charged with and pled guilty 
to transferring obscene material to a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 1470.26 
Dodge, a thirty-three-year-old man, had sent indecent pictures and 
video of himself over the internet to someone he thought was a thir-
teen year-old girl, but who in fact was an undercover agent.27 Although 
Dodge’s conduct clearly fell under a common-sense definition of a “sex 
offense,” Dodge argued that he had not been convicted of a “sex of-
fense” as defined by SORNA and therefore should not have to register 
as a sex offender.28 
 SORNA defines a “sex offense” as: 
(i) a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual 
act or sexual contact with another; (ii) a criminal offense that 
is a specified offense against a minor; (iii) a Federal offense 
. . . under section 1591 or chapter 109A, 110 . . . or 117, of Ti-
tle 18; (iv) a military offense specified by the Secretary of De-
fense under section 115(a)(8)(C)(i) of Public Law 105–119 
(10 U.S.C. 951 note); or an attempt or conspiracy to commit 
an offense described in clauses (i) through (iv).29 
Although § 1470 is not one of the enumerated federal offenses under 
the definition of “sex offense,” the district court held that Dodge had 
nonetheless committed a registerable sex offense under (ii): “a crimi-
nal offense that is a specified offense against a minor.”30 SORNA de-
fines “criminal offense” as “a State, local tribal, foreign, or military of-
fense . . . or other criminal offense.”31 It defines “specified offense against a 
minor” to include offenses by child predators involving, among other 
                                                                                                                      
25 See 597 F.3d at 1351. 
26 Id. at 1349. Section 1470 prohibits the transfer of obscene material to a person un-
der sixteen years old: 
Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign com-
merce, knowingly transfers obscene matter to another individual who has not 
attained the age of 16 years, knowing that such other individual has not attained 
the age of 16 years, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, impris-
oned not more than 10 years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 1470 (2006). 
27 Dodge, 597 F.3d at 1349–50. 
28 See Appellant’s Brief at 10, Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347 (No. 08-10802-BB10). 
29 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A) (2006). 
30 554 F.3d 1357, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 2009) (discussing the district court’s holding), 
rev’d en banc, 597 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2010). 
31 42 U.S.C. § 16911(6) (emphasis added). 
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things, “any conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a mi-
nor.”32 Looking to the facts admitted in Dodge’s guilty plea, the district 
court concluded that Dodge’s conduct was clearly “by its nature a sex 
offense against a minor.”33 
 On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Dodge put forth two arguments 
in his defense.34 First, he argued that SORNA was not intended to in-
clude offenses under § 1470 because that section is not included in 
SORNA’s list of federal sex offenses.35 Under the doctrine of expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius, he argued, the federal offenses listed were 
meant to be exhaustive.36 Second, Dodge urged the Eleventh Circuit to 
take a categorical approach to applying SORNA and only consider 
whether the elements of his statute of conviction, not his underlying 
conduct, met the definition of a sex offense.37 
 Initially, the Eleventh Circuit withheld judgment as to Dodge’s ar-
guments and decided that Dodge did not have to register because 
Dodge’s actions lacked a necessary element of “unwanted sexual assault, 
offense, or other violation that contacts or opposes one’s rights.”38 With-
out any form of contact or physical invasion into the victim’s personal 
space, the court reasoned, Dodge’s conduct could not be considered a 
sex offense “against” a minor.39 
 Sitting en banc in 2010, however, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the 
panel opinion and affirmed the district court’s decision to require reg-
istration.40 The court first rejected Dodge’s argument that the federal 
offenses listed in SORNA are exhaustive.41 The court reasoned that a 
broader reading of the statute did not suggest “an intent to exclude 
certain offenses but rather to expand the scope of offenses that meet 
the statutory criteria.”42 
 The court then rejected Dodge’s argument that courts should take 
a categorical approach in applying SORNA.43 Under a categorical ap-
                                                                                                                      
32 Id. § 16911(7). 
33 Dodge, 554 F.3d at 1359–60 (discussing district court’s holding). 
34 Id. at 1360–62. 
35 Id. at 1360–61; see 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(iii). 
36 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 28, at 11. The doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alte-
rius is a canon of construction and means that to express or include one thing implies the 
exclusion of the other. Black’s Law Dictionary 661–62 (9th ed. 2009). 
37 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 28, at 13. 
38 554 F.3d at 1363. 
39 Id. 
40 597 F.3d at 1349 (en banc). 
41 See id. at 1352–53. 
42 Id. at 1352. 
43 See id. at 1353–54. 
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proach, courts look only at the elements of the defendant’s statute of 
conviction, and not his or her underlying conduct, in determining 
whether the defendant must register under SORNA.44 A categorical 
approach is most commonly used in the context of sentence enhance-
ment statutes and immigration cases.45 For example, in 2008, in Begay v. 
United States,46 the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a categorical approach 
in holding that three prior felonies for drunk driving did not qualify as 
“violent felony” convictions that would trigger a sentence enhancement 
under the Armed Career Criminal Act.47 The Court reasoned that al-
though drunk driving was a dangerous crime, it did not meet the statu-
tory definition of a “violent felony,” which referred to burglary, arson, 
etc.48 Dodge argued that courts should take the same approach in ap-
plying SORNA.49 Under a categorical approach, he argued, his convic-
tion would not meet the statutory definition of a sex offense because 
§ 1470 prohibits a broader range of conduct than what would qualify as 
a sex offense under SORNA.50 Thus, the elements of § 1470 would not 
match the definition of a SORNA sex offense.51 
 In rejecting Dodge’s argument for a categorical approach to 
SORNA, the court relied heavily on 2008 decision by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Byun,52 which held that 
SORNA’s language implies a non-categorical approach.53 In Byun, the 
appellant, Mi Kyung Byun, was convicted of alien smuggling and impor-
tation of an alien for purposes of prostitution.54 As part of her plea 
agreement, Byun admitted to inducing a seventeen-year-old Korean girl 
                                                                                                                      
44 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990) (defining categorical approach 
in the context of a sentence enhancement statute). 
45 See, e.g., James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 202 (2007) (taking a categorical ap-
proach to determine whether a defendant’s conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the 
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005) (ac-
knowledging that the Court usually takes a categorical approach in determining whether a 
defendant’s prior conviction is a burglary under the ACCA); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (holding 
that courts should apply a categorical approach in determining whether a defendant’s prior 
conviction qualifies him for sentence enhancement under the ACCA); Keungne v. U.S. Att’y 
Gen., 561 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2009) (taking a categorical approach in determining 
whether alien’s conviction for criminal reckless conduct was a crime of moral turpitude). 
46 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 141–42. 
49 See Dodge, 597 F.3d at 1353. 
50 See Appellant’s Brief, supra note 28, at 13. 
51 See id. 
52 539 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008). 
53 See Dodge, 597 F.3d at 1353–54; Byun, 539 F.3d at 992. 
54 539 F.3d at 983–84. 
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to work at her night club in Guam and have sex with the club’s clients.55 
Although the facts showed that Byun had committed a sex offense 
against a minor, which would require her to register under SORNA, the 
statute Byun was convicted under did not include an age element.56 
Thus, based solely on Byun’s conviction record, she had not committed 
a registerable sex offense.57 The Ninth Circuit, however, after examining 
the statutory language, held that it could take a non-categorical ap-
proach in applying SORNA and look beyond the elements of Byun’s 
crime to her plea agreement to determine the age of the victim.58 
 The court in Dodge followed Byun in reading SORNA’s language to 
support a non-categorical approach.59 In addition to the provisions ex-
amined in Byun, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the statute’s inclusive 
language as an indication that Congress intended for courts to examine 
an offender’s underlying conduct.60 Thus, the court rejected Dodge’s 
arguments and held that SORNA warranted a non-categorical approach 
in determining whether a conviction qualified as a registerable sex of-
fense.61 
III. Did the Dodge Court Provide Sufficient Due Process? 
 Requiring Dodge to register seems like the correct decision based 
on the facts: an individual who tries to send indecent pictures to minors 
over the internet is certainly the kind of person that sex offender regis-
tries are supposed to keep track of.62 The court’s adoption of a non-
categorical approach to SORNA, however, raises potential due process 
                                                                                                                      
55 Id. at 984. 
56 Id. at 990. 
57 See id. 
58 Id. at 993–94. In holding that it could take a non-categorical approach with regard 
to the victim’s age, the Ninth Circuit followed Taylor v. United States in looking to the statu-
tory language to determine whether Congress intended a categorical or non-categorical 
approach. Byun, 539 F.3d. at 991. See generally Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
The court noted that the pertinent category in the definition of “sex offense” — “a crimi-
nal offense that is a specified offense against a minor” —contains no mention of a crime’s 
elements, as opposed to the preceding category, which defines “sex offense” as “a criminal 
offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another.” Id. at 
991–92 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A) (2006)). Moreover, the list of “specified offense[s] 
against a minor” in § 16911(7) includes “any conduct that by its nature is a sex offense 
against a minor.” Id. at 992 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 16911(7)(I)). The Ninth Circuit thus held 
that use of the word “conduct” indicated that the offender’s underlying conduct is more 
relevant than the elements of the conviction itself. Id. 
59 See Dodge, 597 F.3d at 1353–54. 
60 See id. at 1354–55. 
61 Id. at 1356. 
62 See United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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complications.63 The U.S. Supreme Court has held—in the 2000 deci-
sion in Apprendi v. New Jersey and the 1999 decision in Jones v. United 
States—that under the constitutional guarantees of due process and trial 
by jury, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statu-
tory maximum, aside from a previous conviction, must be submitted to 
a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.64 Although SORNA was 
enacted as a civil regulatory scheme, registration requirements based on 
a non-categorical interpretation of SORNA may push the limits of due 
process if they are not based on facts submitted to a jury.65 Moreover, 
although the Supreme Court dismissed a Fourteenth Amendment due 
process challenge to sex offender registration laws in Connecticut Depart-
ment of Public Safety v. Doe in 2003, it predicated its holding on the fact 
that the registration laws at issue required registration based on convic-
tion history alone.66 A non-categorical approach to registration deter-
minations strays from the line of reasoning that upheld Connecticut 
DPS.67 
A. Is SORNA Punitive? 
 Courts owe defendants different due process measures depending 
on whether the proceeding is civil or criminal.68 If courts find that regis-
tration for sex offenders is punitive in effect, they may owe defendants 
additional due process.69 In Smith v. Doe,70 a 2003 case, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act 
(ASORA) did not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post 
facto laws because ASORA is a civil regulation, not a criminal law.71 De-
                                                                                                                      
63 See infra notes 68–120 and accompanying text. 
64 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 
227, 243 n.6 (1999). 
65 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476; Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6. 
66 See 538 U.S. 1, 4–10 (2003). 
67 See infra notes 110–120 and accompanying text. 
68 Sanford H. Kadish et al., Criminal Law and Its Processes 71–73 (8th ed. 2007) 
(comparing the different procedural requirements in civil versus criminal proceedings); 
see also Richard E. Meyers, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal Law Through a 
Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 1327, 1376–78 (2008) (discussing differences 
between civil and criminal law, including additional procedural protections in criminal 
cases). 
69 See Kadish et al., supra note 68, at 71–73. 
70 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
71 See id. at 105–06. The Supreme Court has not yet considered whether SORNA quali-
fies as a criminal law, but the Office of the Attorney General determined that the registra-
tion requirements considered in Smith were sufficiently similar to SORNA’s requirements 
for Smith to be controlling. See Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notifica-
tion Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,849, 81,851 (Dec. 29, 2010) (Final Rule). 
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spite that holding, however, a growing body of research suggests that 
registration is so burdensome on sex offenders that it may qualify as a 
criminal sanction.72 
 In determining whether a statute is civil or criminal, courts typi-
cally employ an intent-effects test.73 Under this test courts look first to 
whether the legislature intended the law to be criminal or civil.74 If the 
answer is civil, the court then looks at whether the statute is nonetheless 
“so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s inten-
tion to deem it civil.”75 Although SORNA contains a criminal provision 
for failure to register, for the most part Congress intended to create a 
civil regulatory scheme.76 The question, therefore, is whether SORNA 
is nevertheless punitive in effect.77 
 Courts refer to a seven-factor balancing test in evaluating the effect 
prong.78 The factors are: “whether [the statute] involves an affirmative 
disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as pun-
ishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, 
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punish-
ment[,] . . . whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,” 
whether it has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose, and 
whether it appears excessive in relation to that purpose.79 
 Without engaging in a full-fledged analysis of whether SORNA 
qualifies as a criminal law under the seven-factor test, several facts at 
least suggest that registration laws may be punitive in effect.80 First, reg-
istration makes it difficult for offenders to find employment and hous-
ing.81 Employers often either refuse to hire registered sex offenders or 
fire offenders once their conviction history is revealed.82 In addition, 
                                                                                                                      
 
72 See infra note 15; infra notes 16–23 and accompanying text. 
73 See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 See 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,851. 
77 See Smith, 598 U.S. at 92. 
78 See id. at 97. 
79 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963). 
80 See infra notes 81–98 and accompanying text. 
81 See infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
82 See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1010–11 (Alaska 2008) (discussing employment restric-
tions that result from registration); Ctr. for Sex Offender Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Time to Work: Managing the Employment of Sex Offenders Under Community Su-
pervision 1 ( Jan. 2002) [hereinafter CSOM, Time to Work], available at http://www. 
csom.org/pubs/timetowork.pdf (discussing the dilemma posed by the importance of work 
for sex offender rehabilitation and the fact that employers are reluctant to hire sex offend-
ers); Jill S. Levenson & David A. D’Amora, Social Policies to Prevent Sexual Violence: The Emperor’s 
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increasing numbers of states and localities have implemented exclu-
sionary zones where registered sex offenders are not allowed to re-
side.83 As a result, sex offenders can be very restricted in where they are 
able to live and work.84 
 Second, registered sex offenders are frequently subject to vigilante 
violence.85 Public dissemination of offender identities and addresses 
through accessible databases makes it easy for members of the public to 
take justice into their own hands.86 
 Limitations on employment and housing and threats of vigilante 
justice could both be considered affirmative disabilities or restraints on 
sex offenders under the seven-factor test because they severely limit of-
fenders’ fundamental rights.87 In addition, these limitations clearly 
serve as deterrence factors for sex offenders, showing that registration 
promotes the traditional aims of punishment.88 
 Third, evidence suggests that SORNA has a weak connection to a 
non-punitive purpose.89 Congress adopted SORNA in order to protect 
the public from potential re-offenders.90 But, studies show that sex of-
fenders have low rates of recidivism compared to other criminals, which 
undercuts the premise that sex offenders pose a unique threat of re-
                                                                                                                      
New Clothes?, 18 Crim. Just. Pol’y Rev. 168, 172–73 (2007) (noting that a substantial portion 
of sex offenders in Florida and Kentucky reported adverse consequences, such as job loss). 
83 Final Report, supra note 13, at 7–10, 13–14 (discussing the state law trend of resi-
dency restrictions for sex offenders); Amy Baron-Evans, Still Time to Rethink the Misguided 
Approach of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 20 Fed Sent’g Rep. 357, 359 
(2008); Levenson & D’Amora, supra note 82, at 172–73 (discussing the impact of residency 
restrictions on sex offenders); Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Resi-
dency Restrictions on Sex Offenders, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 101, 135–39 (2007) (arguing that the 
trend of residency restrictions on sex offenders is a form of internal banishment). Because 
no state or locality wants to end up being the safe-haven for sex offenders, legislatures have 
passed stronger and stronger residency restrictions to prevent sex offenders from migrat-
ing to those states. Levenson & D’Amora, supra note 82, at 173. Housing difficulties for 
registered offenders can also come in other forms, such housing discrimination by land-
lords. See id. at 173. 
84 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
85 See, e.g., Corey Kilgannon, Threats of Violence as Homes for Sex Offenders Cluster in Suf-
folk, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 2006, at B1 (recounting story about a man who devised a plan to 
burn down a house while registered sex offenders were inside); Gitika Ahuja, Sex Offender 
Registries: Putting Lives at Risk?, ABC News (Apr. 18, 2006), http://abcnews.go.com/US/ 
story?id=1855771&page=1 (recounting story of a young man who murdered two registered 
sex offenders after looking them up in a registry); see also Doe, 189 P.3d at 1010 n.81 (listing 
numerous articles of violence against sex offenders). 
86 See supra note 85. 
87 See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168–69. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. at 168–69; infra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. 
90 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006). 
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offense.91 In addition, studies indicate that treatment is effective in re-
ducing recidivism and that reintegration into society is an important 
part of sex offender rehabilitation.92 Registration, however, often re-
sults in sex offenders being ostracized, reducing their chances to rein-
tegrate and receive treatment.93 In other words, the theoretical founda-
tions for registration are fairly shaky, further pushing it toward the 
punitive end of the spectrum under the seven-factor test.94 Fourth, 
the punitive effects of registration laws may be excessive in relation to 
their stated purpose in at least some circumstances.95 A young man or 
woman who has consensual sex with an underage boyfriend or girl-
friend, for example, is considered a sex offender and required to regis-
ter under the current scheme.96 These kinds of offenders, whose ac-
tions bear a level of moral culpability far below that of more serious 
offenders, do not as clearly deserve the harsh after-effects of registra-
tion.97 
 In summary, there is ample evidence to suggest that registration 
laws meet the intent-effects test and courts should classify SORNA as a 
criminal rather than civil statute.98 
                                                                                                                      
91 See Final Report, supra note 13, at 2 (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics study that 
suggests that sex offenders have lower rates of recidivism than other criminals); Barons-
Evans, supra note 83, at 359 (discussing studies suggesting that recidivism rates among sex 
offenders are lower compared to other criminals); Levenson & D’Amora, supra note 82, at 
177–78 (summarizing studies suggesting that sex offenders have low rates of recidivism). It 
should be noted recidivism rates for sex offenders are still in debate; for an interesting 
discussion of recent research on recidivism rates, see Carl Bialik, How Likely Are Sex Offend-
ers to Repeat Their Crimes?, Wall St. J. Blogs ( Jan. 24, 2008, 11:35 PM), http://blogs.wsj. 
com/numbersguy/how-likely-are-sex-offenders-to-repeat-their-crimes-258/. 
92 Final Report, supra note 13, at 13, 16 (discussing research that suggests that social re-
integration is an important part of rehabilitation); Levenson & D’Amora, supra note 82, at 
177 (citing study that found that treatment is effective); Yung, supra note 83, at 145–46 (dis-
cussing evidence that treatment is effective in reducing recidivism among sex offenders). 
93 See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
94 See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. 
95 See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168–69. 
96 See Ahuja, supra note 85 (reporting case where a registered sex offender, whose 
crime had been having sex with his fifteen-year-old girlfriend when he was twenty, was 
murdered by an individual who had looked up his information on a sex offender registry). 
97 Compare, for example, the crime of the offender in note 96 with that of a serial 
child rapist. See Thomas Kaplan, In Connecticut, A Paroled Serial Rapist Is Met With a Wave of 
Fear and Anger, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 2007, at B1 (describing the release of a serial rapist). 
98 See supra notes 78–97 and accompanying text. 
172 Boston College Law Review Vol. 52: E. Supp. 
B. Does Dodge Violate Due Process Under Jones and Apprendi? 
 If SORNA registration qualifies as a criminal sanction, application 
of the non-categorical approach threatens to violate a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a trial by jury.99 The Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees the right to a jury trial to all criminal defendants.100 In Jones and 
Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that any fact that increases a criminal 
penalty beyond the statutory maximum, aside from the fact of prior 
conviction, must be tried before a jury and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.101 
 Although Dodge itself does not violate Jones-Apprendi, other courts 
may have to be wary of doing so if they follow Dodge in taking a non-
categorical approach to SORNA.102 Dodge does not violate Jones-Apprendi 
for two reasons.103 First, for SORNA registration to trigger Sixth Amend- 
ment protection, the Supreme Court would have to find that registra-
tion is a criminal penalty.104 Although it may do so in the future, it has 
yet to rule on whether SORNA is a civil regulation or criminal sanc-
tion.105 Second, the Eleventh Circuit in Dodge based its finding that 
Dodge committed a sex offense on facts admitted by Dodge in his 
guilty plea.106 Although Jones and Apprendi require facts increasing a 
penalty beyond the statutory maximum to be submitted to a jury, the 
Court has also noted that facts admitted by the defendant may be used 
for penalty increases.107 
                                                                                                                      
99 See U.S. Const. amend. VI; infra notes 100–109 and accompanying text. 
100 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
101 See Apprendi, 530 U.S at 490 (applying the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to a state statute); Jones, 526 U.S. at 243, n.6 (construing a federal statute and 
applying the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). SORNA implicates the Due 
Process Clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because it applies to sex 
offenders under both state and federal jurisdiction. See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Ap-
plicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 28 C.F.R. § 72.1 (2007). 
SORNA’s registration requirements apply directly to offenders under federal jurisdiction; 
and SORNA requires states to incorporate SORNA’s standards into their own registration 
and notification systems. See 28 C.F.R. § 72.1. Dodge was convicted of a federal statute and 
therefore SORNA’s requirements apply to him directly, which means that he is protected 
under the Fifth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Dodge, 597 F.3d at 1349. 
102 See infra notes 103–109 and accompanying text. 
103 See infra notes 104–109 and accompanying text. 
104 See U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
105 See supra note 71. 
106 See 554 F.3d at 1359. 
107 See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (“Our precedents make clear . . . 
that the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may 
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”); Ap-
prendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Jones, 526 U.S. at 243, n.6. 
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 Other courts following Dodge and taking a non-categorical ap-
proach to applying SORNA, however, will have to be wary of basing a 
registration determination on facts neither admitted nor submitted to a 
jury.108 SORNA is arguably so punitive in effect that it qualifies as a 
criminal penalty, and a Sixth Amendment challenge to a registration 
determination based on facts neither tried nor admitted might be suc-
cessful.109 
C. Dodge Nonetheless Pushes the Limits of Due Process 
 Although Dodge satisfies the Sixth Amendment under the Jones-
Apprendi principle, it nonetheless throws doubt on the sufficiency of 
due process offered to registrants.110 The Supreme Court examined 
due process in the context of sex offender registration laws in 2003 in 
Connecticut DPS.111 The defendant in Connecticut DPS argued that Con-
necticut’s registration laws violated the Due Process Clause because the 
state had not provided him a hearing to determine whether he was a 
dangerous offender, so as to warrant his inclusion in a publicly dis-
seminated sex offender registry.112 The Court rejected his argument, 
holding that because the state’s registration requirement was based 
solely on the fact of prior conviction of a sex offense, the defendant was 
not owed a hearing as to his level of dangerousness.113 His prior convic-
tion was a fact that the offender already had a “procedurally safe-
guarded opportunity to contest.”114 The Court further explained that 
to “assert a right to a hearing under the Due Process Clause [the de-
fendant] must show that the facts [he] seek[s] to establish in that hear-
ing are relevant under the statutory scheme.”115 Because the Connecti-
cut registration law was concerned only with the defendant’s conviction 
record and not the likelihood that he would reoffend, the defendant 
did not have a right to a hearing on that fact.116 
 Dodge, however, is distinguishable from Connecticut DPS.117 By tak-
ing a non-categorical approach, the Eleventh Circuit separated the re-
                                                                                                                      
108 See supra notes 68–98 and accompanying text. 
109 See supra notes 68–98 and accompanying text. 
110 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Jones, 526 U.S. at 243, n.6.; Dodge, 597 F.3d at 1355; in-
fra notes 111–120 and accompanying text. 
111 538 U.S. at 4–10. 
112 Id. at 6. 
113 Id. at 7–8. 
114 Id. at 7; see Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-257, -258 (2001). 
115 Connecticut DPS, 538 U.S. at 8. 
116 Id. at 7–8. 
117 See Dodge, 597 F.3d at 1355. 
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quirement to register from Dodge’s conviction record.118 Although 
Dodge itself may present no due process violation, its approach does 
suggest that courts basing registration decisions on non-categorical de-
terminations cannot rely on Connecticut DPS to show that the registra-
tion procedures at issue comport with due process.119 Defendants who 
are required to register based on their underlying conduct may have a 
strong claim to a level-of-dangerousness hearing to establish the basis 
for their inclusion in a publicly disseminated registry.120 
Conclusion 
 Although the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Dodge appears to follow 
accepted standards of statutory construction, a non-categorical ap-
proach to SORNA may raise due process concerns in the future. Given 
that registration requirements have certain punitive characteristics, de-
fendants may be successful in due process challenges to registration 
decisions based on facts neither admitted nor submitted to a jury. 
Moreover, registration decisions based on a non-categorical approach 
stray from the line of reasoning in the 2003 Supreme Court case of 
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe and therefore raise doubts 
about the sufficiency of due process under a non-categorical approach 
to SORNA. To ensure that registered sex offenders receive adequate 
due process, courts and legislatures should either classify registration 
requirements as criminal laws or further clarify the boundaries of what 
information courts can use in making registration determinations. 
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